

June 85

Plans are for "FS" (misnomer)

and FS means city-busting!

("not pop" - but, cities!)

see FAS
April '85

or "econ recovery" (since Oct 80 - C!)

But - if Nure Wichter knocks out
city-busting esp. in retaliation (!) - i.e. "revenge
in kind"

what becomes of "minimum deterrence"? (McGB)

(though, if 10 cities provides this...
"OK"!))

At same time, city-busting = FS needs
revenge ~~is~~ likely - even if suicidal

(that's where suicide is likely!

But also, city-busting
revenge = SS needs
"third-strike, retal
on cities" certain

(? even though,
"probably suicidal"?)

i.e. "you can't deter suicidal
retal in revenge!"

Problem with "within-war deterrence:

one attack (either on cities or on

mil. forces) destroys the conditions

for "deterrence": (1) national, deliberate, calc.

3) Control, ^{civil} pol. control

(2) focus on self-preservation
(vs. revenge, rel. advantage)

Hyp: The world after a few nuclear
explosions or small wars
will exhibit less "moral" or popular
restraints on the further use of nuclear
- because it will ^(may) no longer
feature real democracy in industrial
countries

- (and the incentives to punish will
be greater;
- quasi-military rule
 - desires for revenge
 - denigration of adversaries
 - disregard of future
 - no

Thus, threats will be more credible
(despite prolif?)

And both nuclear, technology, and surveillance
(all favoring superpowers) will give an advantage.

Hyp: "Halliburton strategy" (antibullying threat/punish
for dissidents.)

- What do I mean by "FS" cap?

- HK really made the crucial distinction
rather than AWW (who "mystified".)

- Brodie + Viner observed, ^{this distinction an initial release of} by assuming "pairing" (i.e. SS
Cap.) soon, in 1945-46 - focusing on Type I

- at a time when monopoly existed, and only
Type "II" was relevant for 15-20 years!

("II" should be "I" - for US!)

It is SU that would AWW arise, with
emphasis on Type I:

Type II:

"to prevent war - or uprising."

^{by non-mono presence}
^{or roll-back (China) (Tai)}

(For US: to put down "uprisings - breakouts"
in an sphere - ^{since there} which could not be wholly
deterred ^{on global basis!} - without arousing SU/CC entry!)

[SU could better aim at that, in this sphere:
to avert armed, violent, resistance: Jy
have - till Afghanistan!)

* ^{CC} SU engagement / support; ^{VN; China; Tai} large-scale support;
^{Korea} combat support (air); ^{Korea, VN} troops; have retained ^{DBP} (Quinn, Korea)

Issue: US propensity (desire, contrary to
desires, values and expectations of "public")
to intervene in circumstances, and for purposes
& regions, that are "illegitimate,
aggressive, brutal, imperial, 'unnecessary',"

("Open Door in TW")

e.g. O.D. to US intervention)

Public accepts legit. of some US
interventions — "against SC aggression"

— to prevent [if feasible, at
acceptable cost + methods]

Spread of 'Communism'

(whether some 'misguided' locals want
it or not?)

and Admin tells public:

— some developments ("nationalist,
ultra-
will lead to Com later, 'socialist'...)

if allowed; and later, US intervention would be harder.

— US intervention is feasible if SC can be 'detained'
from intervening.

"Prudent" speech of "Communism" is
= / the main expression of US attitude,
"our charity." !

(expresses an apprec. of "freedom"—
esp. of "free choice,"
"private" enterprise

(and unobstructed access to foreign markets:
"doing well" by "doing good.")